

A person wearing a bright red puffer jacket and a dark beanie is sitting on a rocky ledge, looking out over a vast, layered canyon landscape under a clear sky. The canyon walls are reddish-brown and show distinct geological strata.

SIGNIA INVEST INSIGHTS

June 2023

Signia Invest

One Connaught Place
London
W2 2ET

Contact Us

info@signiainvest.com
+44 (0) 800 756 1094

Website

www.signiainvest.com



5 June 2023

From the Chief Investment Officer (not yet powered by AI)

The Inbetweeners Market

“Everybody wants to buy a bargain, but they want to buy a bargain with no bad news. It doesn't exist; bargains exist because of fear.” Rob Arnott

SUMMARY

- The current rate and business cycle is coming to an end, but it is too early to place bets on the new cycle.
- Performance concentration of a narrow group of mega caps has been at an extreme this year.
- There is strong evidence that the US might face much lower real growth over the next few quarters.
- The Chinese economy is not in a healthy state and requires targeted support – likely more volatility ahead.
- Focusing on areas with a favourable risk/reward remains critical as does stringent risk management.

Markets have been challenging over the last few months. It started with the banking crisis, which came - as crises have it – unexpectedly, leading to a very bifurcated market that was driven by a very narrow set of companies.

Year-to-date, five names are responsible for over 90% of gains in the S&P500 and seven names for all gains – and all of them are technology companies.

It seems investors have decided to bypass the uncertainties over the economic outlook, interest rates and inflation and buy what has worked in the past and what has so far proven to be unassailable.


Investing in stocks that exhibit relative strength is a powerful strategy and, fundamentally, some of the stocks in that group are attractive.

However, there are also reasons for concern.



Midjourney: “Warren Buffett watching the stock market in disbelief, Vermeer style”

Exhibit 1: Performance of different asset classes in 2023



Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., Arbon Ltd., prices as of 31st May 2023



Ever since the end of the pandemic, we have been experiencing an increasingly two-speed economy whereby the consumer is doing fine but the broader economy is showing signs of strain. In essence, the micro is doing alright but the macro is looking a little shaky.

Exhibit 2: The two sides of the same current economy

| The good | The not so good |
|------------------------------|---|
| Discretionary spending | Sticky inflation |
| Wage growth | Oil and commodity prices falling |
| New home sales | Weak credit growth |
| Consumer confidence | Commercial real estate prices declining |
| Pension growth | Chinese equities and credit signalling weakness |
| Income from cash/investments | Leading indicators pointing to weakness |
| Low unemployment | Deeply inverted yield curves |
| | Unemployment claims rising |
| | Germany in recession |
| | US recession probabilities extremely high |

Source(s): Arbion Ltd.

The banking crisis has moved the macro element into the limelight and forecasts of further rate hikes instantly turned to rate cuts when Silicon Valley Bank required a bailout. Stickier inflation has subsequently reversed that view again with markets now expecting one more increase of interest rates in the US, two in the eurozone and four (!) in the UK where inflation is not coming down quickly enough.

This hawkish rate outlook is partly driving some of the other macro variables into a position that reflects a weaker economic outlook. Energy prices have been falling for some time now and many other key commodity prices have reversed course from their post-“China reopening” highs. What’s more, domestically traded commodities in China have been exhibiting substantial weakness (domestic coal prices are down 40% since October), supporting the presence of a dual-speed recovery also in Asia.


Leading indicators as well as deeply inverted yield curves, especially in the US, reflect the sombre mood on the macro side. Add to this the dire state of commercial real estate markets in many countries and it is understandable that many are calling for an end to rate hikes.

On the other side of this equation, we still find the consumer who was bailed out during the pandemic with a variety of support schemes and is now enjoying higher wages, low unemployment and extra income from the literal cash that used to be on the sidelines.

Taken together, we are confronted with a market that is struggling to find direction, pulled and pushed between the Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde.

The contrast between these two sides of the coin are best seen in what investors are expecting policy rates to be over the next few quarters. For the UK, which is still struggling with retail price inflation (RPI) of 11.4% year-on-year (April), markets are expecting four more rate hikes between now and January, whilst for the US where signs of a slowdown are more prominent, investors have priced in one rate cut.

Exhibit 3: Market-implied forecasts (as of 31 May) for cumulative policy rate changes for the next six upcoming central bank meetings



Source(s): Bloomberg Finance L.P., Arbion Ltd.


What are the chances that both are correct and Andrew Bailey is able to pull off a five-rate hike differential between the UK and the US over the next six months? I would take the other side of that trade anytime.

Meanwhile, inflation markets are expecting UK RPI to decline from its current lofty levels of 11.4% to 4.1% in twelve months' time whilst US CPI is expected to fall from 4.9% to 2.4% over the same period.

The winner takes it all, and some

We find similar dichotomies also within asset classes, reflecting the somewhat split-personality state of markets. Within equities, this has become obvious in the extreme concentration of performance within a very small group of leaders.

Exhibit 4: Difference in three-month rolling performance of S&P500 market-cap weighted versus equal-weighted indices



Source(s): Bloomberg Finance L.P., Arbion Ltd.

At a headline level, this is visible in the performance differential between the market-cap weighted S&P500 and its equal-weighted version, which is at a historic record level at the moment.

Zooming in, we see the staggering performance contribution of the top ten largest stocks in the index year-to-date compared to other years. So far in 2023, their performance explains more than 100% of index performance – the highest in 30 years.

Exhibit 5: Annual contribution of the ten largest S&P500 stocks to total market performance (during positive years)


| Company | Performance | % of index move |
|----------------------|--------------|-----------------|
| Apple | 36.8% | 25.0% |
| Microsoft | 37.6% | 23.5% |
| NVIDIA | 158.9% | 20.2% |
| Amazon | 43.5% | 11.4% |
| Meta | 120.0% | 11.4% |
| Tesla | 65.6% | 7.6% |
| Alphabet Class A | 39.3% | 7.3% |
| Alphabet Class C | 39.0% | 6.4% |
| Broadcom | 45.5% | 3.7% |
| Salesforce | 68.5% | 3.2% |
| Average/total | 65.5% | 119.6% |

Source(s): Bloomberg Finance L.P., Arbion Ltd.

No surprise in the names, they are all in tech in a broader sense with Apple and Microsoft being responsible for almost 50% of index performance.

With this degree of concentration, it mattered more what to have rather than what not to have.

Exhibit 6: Annual contribution of the ten largest S&P500 stocks to total market performance (during positive years)



Source(s): Bloomberg Finance L.P., Arbion Ltd.


In this context, it is not surprising that concentrated capitalisations can lead to bizarre effects such as Apple now being more valuable than all companies in the Russell 2000 index together or JPMorgan outweighing all regional banks in the US.

Equally, however, it can also be shown that this is probably not completely unjustified. In the case of Apple, the company has grown its earnings since 2003 from USD50m to just under USD100bn. In that light, is a USD2.6trn market cap too much?

Similarly in the banking world, JPMorgan remains an outstanding, well-managed and highly profitable institution compared to the majority of regional banks, many of which face substantial issues at present.

This phenomenon of concentration is consistent with the underlying concerns about rapidly slowing economies, which can be seen at many levels.

Exhibit 7: Apple stock and the Russell 2000 index: market caps and earnings comparison



Source(s): Bloomberg Finance L.P., Arbion Ltd.

The recession question

In the US, leading indicators are broadly pointing down and are now below the highest reading recorded in a recession. Yield curves continue to be deeply inverted, sending the same signal.


Exhibit 8: US 10 minus 2-year Treasury yield curve, Fed Fund rates and recessionary periods



Source(s): Bloomberg Finance L.P., Arbion Ltd.

Weakness is becoming more broad-based, from housing permits that peaked in early 2022, capital goods spending receding, initial jobless claims moving higher from a very low base as well as bond spreads and sentiment surveys indicating incoming economic contraction.


Exhibit 9: NY Fed probability of a recession within twelve months and Conference Board Leading Indicators index



Source(s): Bloomberg Finance L.P., Arbion Ltd.

Finally and importantly, lending standards have been tightening across the board, leading to less demand for business loans, according to the Senior Loan Officer Survey. The regional banking crisis, which is far from over, will make that crunch even worse. Taken together, this indicator is now at levels last seen in 2001 and 2009. Historically, a drop in loan demand and tightening lending standards only happen a few months before or during a recession.

Exhibit 10: Senior Loan Officer Survey: net % of respondents tightening lending standards minus demand for business loans



Much of the above are market-implied and survey-based soft data that indicate a recession, and it is hard to argue that hard data, for now, are still relatively solid.

However, empirically, the last nine tightening cycles have led to seven recessions; we have corporate earnings declining which usually leads unemployment higher which ultimately leads to a more severe slowdown.

It is important to note that in the current environment of high inflation, a recession can occur without causing a decline in nominal growth. Only on very rare occasions when economies are hit extremely hard, will we see a collapse in real and nominal GDP growth. Recessions in more normal economic regimes tend to be ones where real growth declines, but nominal growth stays positive. Such was the case during the 1970s and 1980s. 2008 and 2020 were quite unusual recessions as they also pulled nominal growth into negative territory.

A good way to illustrate what happens in a stagflationary recession is to look at some consumer names and their revenues and unit sales.

Exhibit 11: Nominal price and unit sales growth for companies in Q1 2023


| | Price | Volume |
|----------------|--------------|--------------|
| Coca Cola | 9.0% | 3.0% |
| Colgate | 12.0% | -3.5% |
| Conagra | 15.1% | -9.0% |
| Hershey | 8.9% | 3.3% |
| Mondelez | 16.2% | 3.2% |
| P&G | 10.0% | -3.0% |
| PepsiCo | 16.0% | -2.0% |
| Unilever | 10.7% | -0.3% |
| Average | 12.2% | -1.0% |

Source(s): TheTranscript

Companies managed to get away with substantial price increases but, naturally, as we have seen in many countries, consumers are trading down and buying less in terms of units. They still end up spending more overall but manage to hit on their disposable incomes by saving more consciously. In the example above, these firms increased prices by 12.2% on average year-on-year in Q1 of this year but faced unit declines of 1%. The increasingly evident issue of shrinkflation is another expression of that tendency – selling a lower quantity/weight in the same package for the same price.

Whilst the debate about a recession in the US is slightly academic at the moment, it is a lot more tangible in other parts of the world.

Exhibit 12: Quarterly GDP growth since Q1 2022 and IMF (International Monetary Fund) forecast for 2023



Source(s): Bloomberg Finance L.P., Arbnion Ltd.

Germany is already in a recession after posting two consecutive quarters of declining GDP with the UK currently predicted by the IMF to end the year in a recession. We still suffer the worst inflation amongst developed countries, dragging down consumer confidence. Although there are signs that rampant food price inflation (19% in April) is cooling down, higher interest rates are absorbing a much higher share of disposable income for many homeowners. As mortgage rates are now set to rise back above 5% over the summer, this would see monthly repayments rise to 28% of incomes.


France appears to be very close to a recession after having only narrowly avoided it so far. The composite PMI as well as the INSEE (Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques) survey have already rolled over since the beginning of 2023 and consumer spending is declining due to high inflation.

The main reason for Germany’s current recession is a record decline in government spending, reversing some of the gains made during COVID. Similar to other countries, private consumption was also negatively affected. The only reason the decline was not more severe, was the strong capex spending by the private sector, i.e. corporate investment. However, the country has also seen new manufacturing and foreign orders dropping substantially. In addition, auto orders are falling and credit demand is weak as consumers are struggling with inflation in addition to softening sentiment because of potential new environmental regulations that are being discussed.

On China

The other major component of the World economic engine that is stuttering at the moment is China. The long-awaited re-opening was brief and much of the debate was dominated by the ongoing geo-political issues. The three major asset classes in the country – equities, rates and the currency – are indicating a very subdued outlook for now.

Exhibit 13: China: 10-year government bond yields, CSI 300 Shenzhen domestic stock market, offshore renminbi CNH




Source(s): Bloomberg Finance L.P., Arbnion Ltd.

Bond yields are approaching the lows of the last lockdown around 2.7% and domestic stocks are still in an entrenched downtrend at levels they traded five years or even 15 years ago. At the same time, the offshore renminbi is only a few percent away from a 15-year low.

Also outside China, several macro aggregates indicate that Chinese demand is not what it used to be. The Australian dollar reflects that weakness well, trading not far off a three-year low. Oil also fails to catch a bid, not just because of China, of course, but Russia's negotiating position also does not help here. Most industrial metals are now substantially below their Dec '22/Jan '23 tops, down up to 40%, in the case of zinc. Nickel, steel rebar and iron ore are faring only slightly better.

Exhibit 14: Ancillary assets are also indicating weak Chinese growth: Copper, Australian dollar and oil



Source(s): Bloomberg Finance L.P., Arbion Ltd.

Within the context of an even more highly politicised relationship between China and the West, it is now even harder to know which information to trust. Whether the official growth figures are trustworthy or not, the best one can assume for this year is probably that China may reach the bottom end of its target range - around the 5% level.


The one connecting element between Europe, China and the one sector in China that is doing well (the consumer) is the luxury segment, and here especially the European names. The leading companies generate between one third and half of their revenues in Asia which is also the area with the strongest growth. Asian consumers, by and large, came out of the pandemic with higher savings and a desire to enjoy their newfound freedom, resulting in a massive shopping extravaganza that helped the luxury sector.

Chinese household savings increased by over RMB20trn year-on-year, far exceeding the typical RMB4-6trn annual savings increase in pre-pandemic years.

The sector has been going from strength to strength and has handily outperformed most of the US technology names. Similar to the US, a handful of names dominate business and stock market performance. For instance, LVMH, Hermes and Dior have compounded at well over 15% annualised since 2000.

Despite this performance, and in stark contrast to many US tech names, the European luxury sector is certainly not cheap but also far from very expensive. This might partly also be because the names are not as well known amongst many retail investors.

Exhibit 15: Arbion European Luxury Goods index and NASDAQ100 since 1st Jan 2000, normalised



Source(s): Bloomberg Finance L.P., Arbion Ltd.


Activity on the ground in China has been slow when we look at traditional industries. Electricity generation, railway freight volumes and cement production have only modestly bounced back so far. Real estate investment, land sales and floor space started for construction are all still contracting. The property crisis that started in 2021 is still ongoing although less so in the public domain than before. More negative headlines are to be expected.

Facing this combination of factors, it is likely that the government will provide some modest stimulus over the course of this year, probably coming in the form of support for regional governments which are struggling under the fallout from the property crisis. This should help Chinese markets and ringfence the current issues.

Looking at indicators that would point to an incoming recession is important primarily for risk management, sector allocations and in the context of knowing where an economy roughly sits at any moment in time. It is somewhat less relevant for security selection, and I try also not to be over-obsessed with the recession question much like the rather pointless debate about the implications of the debt ceiling not being lifted in time.

It is ultimately and primarily earnings growth that drives stocks and, obviously, stock prices are quoted in nominal terms, not real prices. As a result, during inflationary periods, earnings can rise meaningfully.

Exhibit 16: Rolling four-quarter S&P500 earnings, trend earnings (log scale) and trailing four-quarter S&P500 PER



Source(s): Bloomberg Finance L.P., Arbion Ltd.

As we can see, over the long run, earnings growth is quite stable and stock prices follow as a result, subject to fluctuations in valuation multiples which are partly driven by interest rates. This is summarised in the chart above that shows that the volatility of earnings is lower than that of valuations, which results in stocks being more volatile than the economy. Nominal earnings growth over the period was just under 7%, roughly in line with annual total returns of stock markets.

Returning to the current situation, Q1 real GDP growth in the US was 1.6% with nominal GDP growing at 7.1%. If real growth were to decline to 0% and inflation were to fall by 2%, we would still have nominal GDP growing at a rate of 3.5%. This is the number we would expect to see in terms of broader revenue growth at a corporate level. Therefore, a recession in this environment per se doesn't have to spread doom and gloom across the stock market. Lower growth will enable companies to manage their cost base more efficiently, maintaining margins and, with the exception of very cyclical industries remain profitable, setting the stage for a recovery off a leaner cost base.

It might be too early to say this, but US stocks already experienced an earnings recession last year when operating earnings fell by 18% from peak and stock prices declined by 25% before reaching the October 2022 low.

Real estate

One of the first areas that came substantially under pressure in the current rate hike cycle was real estate and in particular commercial real estate. A few years ago, pre-pandemic, the retail side of sector came under pressure from the Amazonification of the world that saw many bricks-and-mortar businesses fail, especially in markets with a high retail shopping density.


The pandemic then added the additional element of working-from-home, which now appears to become a more permanent feature in many developed countries. This can be seen in cell phone activity data which in many large cities is only at approximately half the 2019 level. Office vacancies have increased as a result, entailing distress for owners who are also facing rising refinancing costs.

As a leveraged asset play, real estate is clearly very rate-sensitive and, therefore, REITs (real estate investment trusts), came under huge pressure already last year. US-listed REITs lost 29% when the S&P500 was down 18%. In Europe, the EPRA REIT index (European Real Estate Association) lost even more and was down 32% when the Euro Stoxx 50 index lost 12%.

In essence, European real estate due to its substantially lower interest rates, turned into a longer-duration asset whose values were pushed higher by investors who wanted to escape the negative rate regime. Logically, the move higher in rates hurt that market more than others.

Generally, due to their leveraged nature, property stocks tend to follow their underlying markets with a 2-4x sensitivity which explains substantial losses across the space, despite some more moderate pullbacks in physical markets.

Exhibit 17: Green Street Commercial Property Price Index* and Bloomberg US REIT index (lhs), Green Street Pan-European Commercial Property Price Index and EPRA developed Europe REIT index year-on-year changes (rhs)**




*All Property US CPPI weights: retail (20%), office (17.5%), apartment (15%), health care (15%), industrial (10%), lodging (7.5%), net lease (5%), self-storage (5%), manufactured home park (2.5%), and student housing (2.5%). Retail is mall (50%) and strip retail (50%). Core Sector CPPI weights: apartment (25%), industrial (25%), office (25%), and retail (25%).

**CPPI Europe Core Sector Average is equally-weighted between the Industrial, Office, and Retail sectors.

Source(s): Bloomberg Finance L.P., Arbion Ltd.

The charts above for the US and developed Europe show how closely REIT prices follow underlying markets and that they, in fact, move ahead of physical markets, at least in terms of reported data points (it takes time to compile and publish price indices and they rely on backward-looking data, which means that in real life, REIT performance is probably in-line with real-time price action). With US and European REITs now 33% and 48% below their respective peaks, this segment could become interesting at some stage once we have more evidence that central banks are finished tightening policy further.

Exhibit 18: Nationwide real UK house prices in current prices and drawdown from peak




Source(s): Nationwide, Arbion Ltd.

The UK is an interesting market in this regard. Due to the devastating effects of the GFC (Great Financial Crisis) and the subsequent Brexit referendum, in addition to making it more difficult and expensive for foreigners to own property, real estate markets have never really quite followed the boom in the US and the eurozone.

In real terms, UK house prices are more than 20% below their 2007 peak and at levels last seen in 2014. More importantly, they have now spent a record time 'underwater', i.e. not making new highs (in real terms). It took them more than twelve years to recover from the previous downturn during the 1990s but they have been below their most recent peak now for more than 15 years already.

Exhibit 19: Difference of 10-year UK government yields and UK property cap rates



Source(s): CBRE, Arblion Ltd.

Whilst real estate is rate sensitive, it is important to remember that property is not a bond. Cap rates, i.e. discount rates used to discount rental streams from property investments have been relatively stable over time (between ~4% and ~8% over the last decades) within their respective segments. We can see this in the premium or discount of government bond yields over all-property cap yields in the UK which is similar to what we can observe in other markets. Historically, until the mid 1990s, bond yields exceeded property yields whilst this dynamic shifted decisively in the aftermath of the GFC when bond yields drifted below cap rates for real estate. This explains why real estate was so attractive initially post 2008, especially in the eurozone.

The flipside of higher interest rates

Much of the current debate is focused on the negative effects higher interest rates have on the economy, and it is undeniable that they already left their marks in many sectors. However, I also find the discussion somewhat disingenuous, as it was only a few years ago when we all complained about financial oppression and the challenging circumstances for savers.

Now, we have finally returned to a world where low-risk assets such as cash and bonds pay a meaningful interest rate and investors have more than one option to diversify their portfolio.


Higher interest rates simply also mean higher income. And this is now reaching significant dimensions. For instance, US money market funds have received substantial inflows over the last months, have now grown to around USD6trn in total and are likely to grow further.

Using current yields on these funds implies monthly income of circa USD25bn at present or USD300bn per year, a number that is likely to rise further.

To put this in context, this is the equivalent of two thirds of US oil consumption or more than 1.3% of US GDP. Add to this figure the income from bond holdings plus deposit rates and this in itself amounts to a huge stimulus for consumers. Altogether, it likely covers 100% of the US oil bill.

This is part of the reason why the consumer is more resilient than expected, although obviously not all money market fund holdings are held by individuals. A large part can certainly be attributed to corporates which provides support for business profits going forward.

Exhibit 20: Estimated inflation-adjusted monthly income from US money market funds (in 2023 dollars)



* Estimates based on St. Louis Fed total US money market fund assets and the yield of Vanguard Federal Money Market Fund

Source(s): Bloomberg Finance L.P., Arbon Ltd.

Risk management and where we go from here

Markets have been trading within a broad range since 2019. We are currently in the middle of that range and back to levels last visited in early 2021 and 2022. The range measures approximately 40% up from its floor.

Market downside is somewhat limited by valuations that are not extremely high and the outlook of declining inflation and potentially interest rates. The upside is capped by an earnings outlook that is not very strong and multiples that are on the higher end of their historic range.

Exhibit 21: MSCI World over the past four years



Source(s): Bloomberg Finance L.P., Arbon Ltd.

In markets trading within broad sideways ranges or at the risk of more severe drawdowns, risk management becomes even more important than it usually is in managing portfolios.

As markets tend to decline faster than they rise, cutting losses quickly or ideally avoiding them altogether is clearly very beneficial for long-term returns.

One can see the impact a drawdown can have on the amount of time required to recover, which is a function of expected/realised future after-tax returns. Normally, assuming reasonable return assumptions, once a portfolio or a position lost more than 30%, it is

likely to take many years to recoup such losses. This might be easier on a single-position level, but it is much harder for a large diversified portfolio which is likely to generate returns that are closer to market returns.

For instance, to recover from a 30% loss and assuming a 5% reinvested after-tax yield, would take over seven years to break even.

Exhibit 22: Years required to recover from a portfolio drawdown given different after-tax return assumptions

| | | Annual return, after-tax | | | | | | | | |
|----------|-----|--------------------------|------|------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | | 2.0% | 3.0% | 4.0% | 5.0% | 7.5% | 10.0% | 12.5% | 15.0% | 17.5% |
| Drawdown | 5% | 2.6 | 1.7 | 1.3 | 1.1 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 |
| | 10% | 5.3 | 3.6 | 2.7 | 2.2 | 1.5 | 1.1 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.7 |
| | 15% | 8.2 | 5.5 | 4.1 | 3.3 | 2.2 | 1.7 | 1.4 | 1.2 | 1.0 |
| | 20% | 11.3 | 7.5 | 5.7 | 4.6 | 3.1 | 2.3 | 1.9 | 1.6 | 1.4 |
| | 25% | 14.5 | 9.7 | 7.3 | 5.9 | 4.0 | 3.0 | 2.4 | 2.1 | 1.8 |
| | 30% | 18.0 | 12.1 | 9.1 | 7.3 | 4.9 | 3.7 | 3.0 | 2.6 | 2.2 |
| | 35% | 21.8 | 14.6 | 11.0 | 8.8 | 6.0 | 4.5 | 3.7 | 3.1 | 2.7 |
| | 40% | 25.8 | 17.3 | 13.0 | 10.5 | 7.1 | 5.4 | 4.3 | 3.7 | 3.2 |
| | 45% | 30.2 | 20.2 | 15.2 | 12.3 | 8.3 | 6.3 | 5.1 | 4.3 | 3.7 |
| | 50% | 35.0 | 23.4 | 17.7 | 14.2 | 9.6 | 7.3 | 5.9 | 5.0 | 4.3 |
| | 55% | 40.3 | 27.0 | 20.4 | 16.4 | 11.0 | 8.4 | 6.8 | 5.7 | 5.0 |
| | 60% | 46.3 | 31.0 | 23.4 | 18.8 | 12.7 | 9.6 | 7.8 | 6.6 | 5.7 |
| | 65% | 53.0 | 35.5 | 26.8 | 21.5 | 14.5 | 11.0 | 8.9 | 7.5 | 6.5 |
| | 70% | 60.8 | 40.7 | 30.7 | 24.7 | 16.6 | 12.6 | 10.2 | 8.6 | 7.5 |
| | 75% | 70.0 | 46.9 | 35.3 | 28.4 | 19.2 | 14.5 | 11.8 | 9.9 | 8.6 |
| | 80% | 81.3 | 54.4 | 41.0 | 33.0 | 22.3 | 16.9 | 13.7 | 11.5 | 10.0 |

Source(s): Arbion Ltd.

Therefore, having protective measures in place, which do not have to be permanent features, can avoid a severe drawdown in the first place and set up the investor to benefit from lower asset prices once markets recover.

Importantly, and this is an underappreciated point usually; significant losses almost always have a deeply negative impact on investors' psychology. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky in 1992 suggested that the pain of losing is twice as powerful as the pleasure of gaining.

This leads to undesirable outcomes as investors tend to capitulate near the bottom and, because of the traumatic experience, delay coming back to the market, only to find themselves reinvesting nearer the top, perpetuating the problems, which is the opposite of what a rational investor ought to do.

Managed correctly, cutting out major drawdowns enables investors to re-enter with a fresh and unencumbered mindset, which enables them to see volatile markets and lower asset prices for what they are – major opportunities for future returns.

Avoiding downside risks can be achieved in three principal forms:

- 1) **Holding cash.** Cash is fortunately a very viable asset class again, paying substantial interest. De-risking a portfolio during uncertain periods is therefore not fraught anymore with the risk of losing out. One is literally getting paid to wait. Typically, this is an approach we prefer as it is cost-efficient and generating income.
- 2) **Hedging with put options.** Short of reducing the size of a portfolio is limiting the risk via put options. Due to the cost of options, this is rather a tactical measure and should only be used during particularly uncertain periods, such as the one we currently face, or when hedging is extraordinarily cheap – typically when markets are very bullish. Options allow for the portfolio to be untouched and, hence, fully participate in the upside whilst hedging the treaded left tail of the return distribution.
- 3) **Modifying the structure of the portfolio.** In order to potentially reduce downside risks, a change in the composition of the portfolio is another important option to consider. This would entail reducing higher-beta positions, companies that are loss-making, positions with weak balance sheets as well as highly cyclical businesses. This can achieve a lot towards making a portfolio more weather-proof.

Looking at the current circumstances and the rest of the year, medium-duration investment-grade credit still appears to be the best bet one can make on a risk-adjusted basis but we also do not want to be carried away by what appears to be excessive pessimism towards the economy. Sure, it is very likely that we will see consumers retrenching after the recent inflationary shock and economic growth is likely to fall in the near term with all the consequences this typically entails but many stocks are also trading significantly below their previous peaks reflecting this outlook.

From a market perspective, we are closely watching the performance of early cyclicals to get an indication at what point stock and bond markets will start trading the new cycle as opposed to being pulled and pushed by coincident current events.

GLOBAL ECONOMIC MONITOR

| | Dec | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | | Trend |
|----------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--|--------------------------------------|
| Citi Economic Surprise US | -2.7 | -6.1 | 38.6 | 57.0 | 22.0 | 23.7 | | ▲ |
| Citi Economic Surprise G10 | 20.2 | 32.1 | 45.4 | 49.2 | 19.8 | -7.1 | | ▼ |
| Citi Economic Surprise Europe | 67.9 | 97.2 | 61.8 | 50.0 | 15.2 | -62.9 | | ▼ |
| Citi Economic Surprise EM | -20.6 | 8.3 | 2.4 | 26.5 | 35.6 | 10.6 | | ▲ |
| Citi Economic Surprise UK | 39.7 | 19.2 | -1.1 | 51.5 | 86.8 | 79.8 | | ▲ |
| ISM manufacturing | 48.4 | 47.4 | 47.7 | 46.3 | 47.1 | 46.9 | | ▲ |
| ISM new orders | 45.15 | 51.45 | 54.8 | 48.25 | 50.9 | | | ▲ |
| Global manufacturing PMI | 48.2 | 49.7 | 52.1 | 53.4 | 54.2 | | | ▲ |
| China manufacturing PMI | 47.0 | 50.1 | 52.6 | 51.9 | 49.2 | 48.8 | | ▲ |
| Japan manufacturing PMI | 48.9 | 48.9 | 47.7 | 49.2 | 49.5 | 50.6 | | ▲ |
| US durable goods orders | 4.5 | -1.3 | -2.7 | 3.3 | 1.1 | | | ▼ |
| US initial jobless claims | 206 | 199 | 221 | 228 | 242 | 232 | | ▲ |
| US Industrial production | -1.6 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.5 | | | ▲ |
| Euro Industrial production | -1.0 | 0.6 | 1.5 | -4.1 | | | | ▼ |
| Japan Industrial production | 0.3 | -5.3 | 4.6 | 1.1 | -0.4 | | | ▼ |
| US retail sales | -0.7 | 2.8 | -0.7 | -0.7 | 0.4 | | | ▲ |
| Euro retail sales | -1.6 | 1.0 | -0.2 | -1.2 | | | | ▼ |
| Japan retail sales | 3.8 | 5.0 | 7.3 | 6.9 | 5.0 | | | ▼ |
| China retail sales | -1.8 | 10.6 | 18.4 | | | | | ▲ |
| US consumer confidence | 109.0 | 106.0 | 103.4 | 104.0 | 103.7 | 102.3 | | ▲ |
| Euro consumer confidence | -22.0 | -20.6 | -19.0 | -19.1 | -17.5 | -17.4 | | ▲ |
| ifo German business expectations | 83.3 | 86.1 | 88.2 | 91.1 | 91.7 | 88.6 | | ▼ |
| China export trade | -9.9 | -10.4 | -1.3 | 14.8 | | | | ▲ |
| South Korea export trade | -9.7 | -16.4 | -7.6 | -13.8 | -14.3 | -15.2 | | ▼ |
| German export trade | 6.6 | 9.4 | 7.7 | 4.3 | | | | ▼ |
| China monthly money supply | 11.8 | 12.6 | 12.9 | 12.7 | 12.4 | | | ▲ |
| US personal income | 0.2 | 0.6 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | | | ▲ |

Source(s): Bloomberg Finance L.P., Arbion Ltd.

THE WORLD IN NUMBERS

| US | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------------|------|---------|-------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|-----------------|-----------|---------|----------|------------|----------|
| Date | PMI | CPI (%) | Disc rate % | Ind Prodyoy% | Exports (\$M) | Imports (\$M) | Trade bal (\$M) | M2 (\$bn) | M2 mom% | Unempl % | Date | GDP yoy% |
| 30/11/2022 | 37.9 | 7.1 | 4.00 | 1.85 | 172,968 | 259,172 | -86,204 | 21,399 | | 3.6 | 30/06/2022 | 1.8 |
| 31/12/2022 | 45.1 | 6.50 | 4.50 | 0.58 | 169,847 | 255,169 | -85,322 | 21,358 | -0.2% | 3.5 | 30/09/2022 | 1.9 |
| 31/01/2023 | 44.3 | 6.4 | 4.50 | 1.46 | 168,568 | 256,743 | -88,175 | 21,213 | -0.7% | 3.4 | 31/12/2022 | 0.9 |
| 28/02/2023 | 43.6 | 6 | 4.75 | 0.81 | 160,266 | 233,105 | -72,839 | 21,077 | -0.6% | 3.6 | 31/03/2023 | 1.6 |
| 31/03/2023 | 43.8 | 5 | 5.00 | 0.07 | 185,876 | 265,409 | -79,533 | 20,840 | -1.1% | 3.5 | | |
| 30/04/2023 | 48.6 | 4.9 | 5.00 | 0.24 | | | | 20,673 | -0.8% | 3.4 | | |
| 31/05/2023 | 40.4 | | 5.25 | | | | | | | 3.7 | | |

| CHINA | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------------|------|---------|-------------|--------------|----------------|----------------|------------------|------------|---------|----------|------------|----------|
| Date | PMI | CPI (%) | Disc rate % | Ind Prodyoy% | Exports (\$bn) | Imports (\$bn) | Trade bal (\$bn) | M2 (RMBbn) | M2 mom% | Unempl % | Date | GDP yoy% |
| 30/11/2022 | 48 | 1.6 | 1.50 | 2.2 | 294.886 | 226.373 | 68.5 | 264,701 | | | 30/06/2022 | 0.4 |
| 31/12/2022 | 47 | 1.8 | 1.50 | 1.3 | 305.529 | 228.59 | 76.9 | 266,432 | 0.7% | | 30/09/2022 | 3.9 |
| 31/01/2023 | 50.1 | 2.1 | 1.50 | 3.9 | 292.175 | 192.831 | 99.3 | 273,807 | 2.8% | | 31/12/2022 | 2.9 |
| 28/02/2023 | 52.6 | 1 | 1.50 | 5.6 | 213.821 | 197.381 | 16.4 | 275,525 | 0.6% | | 31/03/2023 | 4.5 |
| 31/03/2023 | 51.9 | 0.7 | 1.50 | | 315.543 | 227.342 | 88.2 | 281,457 | 2.2% | | | |
| 30/04/2023 | 49.2 | 0.1 | 1.50 | | 295.418 | 205.21 | 90.2 | 280,850 | -0.2% | | | |
| 31/05/2023 | 48.8 | | 1.50 | | | | | | | | | |

| GERMANY | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------------|------|---------|-------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|-----------------|-------------|------------|----------|------------|----------|
| Date | PMI | CPI (%) | Disc rate % | Ind Prodyoy% | Exports (€bn) | Imports (€bn) | Trade bal (€bn) | M2 EZ (€bn) | M2 EZ mom% | Unempl % | Date | GDP yoy% |
| 30/11/2022 | 46.2 | 8.8 | 2.00 | -0.5 | 136.4 | 125.6 | 10.8 | 15,335,063 | | 5.5 | 30/06/2022 | 1.4 |
| 31/12/2022 | 47.1 | 8.1 | 2.50 | -3.3 | 128.2 | 116.9 | 11.3 | 15,328,202 | 0.0% | 5.5 | 30/09/2022 | 0.8 |
| 31/01/2023 | 47.3 | 8.7 | 2.50 | -1.6 | 131.6 | 115.9 | 15.7 | 15,230,801 | -0.6% | 5.5 | 31/12/2022 | -0.1 |
| 28/02/2023 | 46.3 | 8.7 | 3.00 | 0.7 | 136.8 | 120.3 | 16.5 | 15,172,754 | -0.4% | 5.5 | 31/03/2023 | -0.5 |
| 31/03/2023 | 44.7 | 7.4 | 3.50 | 1.8 | 128.8 | 113.9 | 14.9 | 15,173,528 | 0.0% | 5.6 | | |
| 30/04/2023 | 44.5 | 7.2 | 3.50 | | | | | 15,156,350 | -0.1% | 5.6 | | |
| 31/05/2023 | 43.2 | 6.1 | 3.75 | | | | | | | 5.6 | | |

| UK | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------------|------|---------|-------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|------------------|-----------|---------|----------|------------|----------|
| Date | PMI | CPI (%) | Disc rate % | Ind Prodyoy% | Exports,GBPM | Imports,GBPM | Trade bal (GBPM) | M2 (GBPM) | M2 mom% | Unempl % | Date | GDP yoy% |
| 30/11/2022 | 46.5 | 10.7 | 3.00 | -2.9 | 74,670 | 76,240 | -1,570 | 2,280,027 | | 3.7 | 30/06/2022 | 3.8 |
| 31/12/2022 | 45.3 | 10.5 | 3.50 | -2.7 | 71,042 | 77,994 | -6,952 | 2,289,483 | 0.4% | 3.7 | 30/09/2022 | 2 |
| 31/01/2023 | 47 | 10.1 | 3.50 | -3.0 | 69,283 | 72,235 | -2,952 | 2,256,077 | -1.5% | 3.7 | 31/12/2022 | 0.6 |
| 28/02/2023 | 49.3 | 10.4 | 4.00 | -2.7 | 67,740 | 71,094 | -3,354 | 2,255,783 | 0.0% | 3.8 | 31/03/2023 | 0.2 |
| 31/03/2023 | 47.9 | 10.1 | 4.25 | -2.0 | 66,937 | 69,801 | -2,864 | 2,266,778 | | 3.9 | | |
| 30/04/2023 | 47.8 | 8.7 | 4.25 | | | | | 2,259,209 | | | | |
| 31/05/2023 | 47.1 | | 4.50 | | | | | | | | | |

| JAPAN | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------------|---------|-------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|-------------------|--------------|---------|----------|------------|----------|--|
| Date | CPI (%) | Disc rate % | Ind Prodyoy% | Exports,JPYbn | Imports,JPYbn | Trade bal (JPYbn) | M2 (JPY TRN) | M2 mom% | Unempl % | Date | GDP yoy% | |
| 30/11/2022 | 3.8 | | -0.9 | 8,837 | 10,869 | -2,032 | 1,213 | | 2.5 | 30/06/2022 | 1.8 | |
| 31/12/2022 | 4.0 | | -2.4 | 8,787 | 10,246 | -1,459 | 1,213 | 0.0% | 2.5 | 30/09/2022 | 1.6 | |
| 31/01/2023 | 4.3 | | -3.1 | 6,551 | 10,057 | -3,506 | 1,213 | 0.0% | 2.4 | 31/12/2022 | 0.4 | |
| 28/02/2023 | 3.3 | | -0.5 | 7,654 | 8,574 | -920 | 1,209 | -0.3% | 2.6 | 31/03/2023 | 1.3 | |
| 31/03/2023 | 3.2 | | -0.6 | 8,824 | 9,583 | -759 | 1,213 | 0.4% | 2.8 | | | |
| 30/04/2023 | 3.5 | | -0.3 | 8,289 | 8,721 | -432 | 1,232 | 1.6% | 2.6 | | | |

| INDIA | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------------|---------|-------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|-----------------|--------------|---------|----------|------------|----------|--|
| Date | CPI (%) | Disc rate % | Ind Prodyoy% | Exports (\$M) | Imports (\$M) | Trade bal (\$M) | M3 (INR 10M) | M2 mom% | Unempl % | Date | GDP yoy% | |
| 30/11/2022 | 5.9 | 5.90 | 7.6 | 31,992 | 55,885 | -23,893 | 21,397,426 | | | 30/06/2022 | 11.95 | |
| 30/12/2022 | 5.7 | 6.25 | 5.1 | 34,477 | 58,244 | -23,767 | 21,859,358 | 2.2% | | 30/09/2022 | 5.41 | |
| 31/01/2023 | 6.5 | 6.25 | 5.5 | 32,914 | 50,657 | -17,743 | 21,894,248 | 0.2% | | 31/12/2022 | 4.73 | |
| 28/02/2023 | 6.4 | 6.50 | 5.8 | 33,877 | 51,309 | -17,432 | 22,101,519 | 0.9% | | 31/03/2023 | 6.48 | |
| 31/03/2023 | 5.7 | 6.50 | 1.1 | 38,381 | 58,109 | -19,728 | 22,333,020 | 1.0% | | | | |
| 28/04/2023 | 4.7 | 6.50 | | 34,662 | 49,896 | -15,234 | 22,682,193 | 1.6% | | | | |
| 31/05/2023 | | 6.50 | | | | | 22,764,913 | | | | | |

Source(s): Bloomberg Finance L.P., Arbion Ltd.


PERFORMANCE AND VALUATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL EQUITY MARKETS

| Country | | Year to date | Market Cap (USDbn)* | Rolling 1-yr change | Rolling 2-yr change | Rolling 3-yr change | PER | | EPS growth 2024E | Dividend yield | |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|--------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------|-------|------------------|----------------|-------|
| | | | | | | | 2023E | 2024E | | 2023E | 2024E |
| WORLD | | | | | | | | | | | |
| All Country MSCI | MXWD Index | 9.6% | 78,525 | 2.2% | -7.4% | 23.1% | 16.7 | 15.1 | 10.7% | 2.3% | 2.4% |
| Developed World | MXWO Index | 10.4% | 59,431 | 3.4% | -4.1% | 26.8% | 17.2 | 15.7 | 9.5% | 2.2% | 2.3% |
| Emerging World | MXEF Index | 2.9% | 19,094 | -7.2% | -28.8% | -1.8% | 12.9 | 11.0 | 18.0% | 3.0% | 3.2% |
| AMERICAS | | | | | | | | | | | |
| US (S&P500) | SPX Index | 11.5% | 36,372 | 4.2% | 1.2% | 34.1% | 19.6 | 17.6 | 11.4% | 1.6% | 1.7% |
| US (Dow Jones Industrial) | INDU Index | 1.9% | 10,855 | 2.6% | -2.9% | 24.5% | 17.4 | 15.7 | 10.9% | 2.1% | 2.2% |
| US mid/small cap | RTY Index | 4.0% | 2,628 | -2.8% | -19.9% | 21.5% | 26.0 | 18.7 | 39.3% | 1.7% | |
| Canada | SPTSX Index | 3.3% | 2,292 | -3.7% | 0.0% | 26.3% | 13.7 | 12.6 | 8.4% | 3.6% | 3.7% |
| Mexico | MEXBOL Index | 9.8% | 389 | 5.0% | 5.4% | 36.7% | 12.1 | 11.1 | 8.8% | 3.6% | 4.3% |
| Argentina | MERVAL Index | 74.6% | 43 | 284.6% | 433.2% | 682.1% | 13.7 | 4.3 | 221.1% | | |
| Brazil | IBOV Index | 2.6% | 624 | 1.3% | -13.5% | 18.9% | 7.8 | 7.3 | 6.1% | 6.3% | 6.4% |
| EUROPE | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Europe | SXXP Index | 8.8% | 13,021 | 5.0% | 2.1% | 23.1% | 13.0 | 11.9 | 9.0% | 3.5% | 3.8% |
| Germany | DAX Index | 15.3% | 1,578 | 11.0% | 2.3% | 24.9% | 11.4 | 10.4 | 9.0% | 3.5% | 3.8% |
| France | CAC Index | 12.3% | 2,491 | 12.1% | 11.6% | 39.9% | 12.8 | 11.6 | 10.0% | 3.3% | 3.5% |
| UK | UKX Index | 2.1% | 2,487 | 1.0% | 7.6% | 17.3% | 10.5 | 10.0 | 5.9% | 4.1% | 4.4% |
| Spain | IBEX Index | 13.2% | 624 | 6.8% | 2.5% | 18.4% | 10.5 | 10.4 | 1.3% | 4.7% | 4.9% |
| Italy | FTSEMIB Index | 14.2% | 611 | 12.0% | 5.9% | 34.1% | 8.2 | 7.8 | 5.9% | 5.4% | 5.6% |
| Switzerland | SMI Index | 6.7% | 1,392 | -0.7% | -1.1% | 12.3% | 18.3 | 15.7 | 16.8% | 3.1% | 3.3% |
| Norway | OBX Index | 1.2% | 220 | -4.8% | 9.4% | 43.7% | 9.2 | 8.6 | 6.9% | 7.6% | 7.1% |
| Sweden | OMX Index | 12.2% | 764 | 10.8% | 0.9% | 32.5% | 15.0 | 14.0 | 6.8% | 3.6% | 3.8% |
| Austria | ATX Index | 0.4% | 93 | -6.9% | -10.9% | 26.3% | 6.8 | 6.9 | -2.0% | 6.0% | 6.2% |
| Greece | ASE Index | 31.0% | 80 | 35.8% | 35.1% | 78.2% | 8.6 | 12.2 | -29.7% | 3.8% | 4.3% |
| EMERGING EUROPE | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Hungary | BUX Index | 9.3% | 23 | 15.9% | -0.9% | 26.0% | 6.2 | 5.1 | 22.6% | 5.7% | 5.7% |
| Kazakhstan | KZKAK Index | 7.8% | 12 | 33.2% | 2.7% | 50.9% | | | | | |
| Ukraine | PFTS Index | -2.3% | 1 | -2.3% | -4.5% | 1.5% | | | | | |
| Russia | RTSI\$ Index | 8.3% | 487 | -12.3% | -36.2% | -18.2% | 3.1 | | | 18.0% | 29.3% |
| Poland | WIG Index | 14.3% | 284 | 15.5% | -1.8% | 27.5% | 8.2 | 8.3 | -1.0% | 4.6% | 5.0% |
| Czech Rep | PX Index | 9.5% | 52 | -1.1% | 11.6% | 37.4% | 8.7 | 8.3 | 5.1% | 7.4% | 6.9% |
| Turkey | XU100 Index | -7.2% | 197 | 96.6% | 257.0% | 364.9% | 4.6 | 4.3 | 7.8% | 4.1% | 4.1% |
| MIDDLE EAST & AFRICA | | | | | | | | | | | |
| South Africa | TOP40 Index | 7.5% | 889 | 11.9% | 16.8% | 43.4% | 10.8 | 9.4 | 14.9% | 4.1% | 4.6% |
| Egypt | Hermes Index | 21.1% | | 80.3% | 80.7% | 105.4% | 6.1 | 5.8 | 5.0% | 4.7% | 5.5% |
| Namibia | FTN098 Index | -4.6% | 101 | -12.8% | 7.3% | 39.5% | 8.2 | 8.1 | 2.2% | 6.5% | 7.1% |
| Nigeria | NGSEINDEX Index | 8.9% | 66 | 5.5% | 44.1% | 123.1% | | | | | |
| Israel | TA-25 Index | -3.8% | | -9.1% | 2.5% | 20.1% | 7.8 | 6.8 | 15.3% | 3.1% | |
| Saudi Arabia | SASEIDX Index | 5.1% | | -12.6% | 3.4% | 51.2% | 16.0 | 14.0 | 14.0% | 3.8% | 4.3% |
| Qatar | DSM Index | -4.4% | | -20.2% | -5.5% | 12.6% | 11.4 | 10.5 | 9.2% | | |
| Dubai | DFMGI Index | 8.0% | | 6.4% | 27.6% | 76.7% | 8.6 | 9.0 | -4.8% | 4.9% | 5.0% |
| ASIA | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Asia | MXAPEXA Index | 4.4% | 3,835 | -6.8% | -34.2% | -8.4% | 14.3 | 11.7 | 22.3% | 2.2% | 2.4% |
| Japan | TPX Index | 15.4% | 5,502 | 12.9% | 11.4% | 35.4% | 14.2 | 12.9 | 10.1% | 2.4% | 2.6% |
| Japan | NKY Index | 20.8% | 3,845 | 13.6% | 8.9% | 37.9% | 19.1 | 16.6 | 15.1% | 1.9% | 2.0% |
| Hong Kong | HSI Index | -4.2% | 2,611 | -10.1% | -34.5% | -23.5% | 9.2 | 8.4 | 9.3% | 4.0% | 4.3% |
| | shashr Index | 4.6% | 6,594 | 1.1% | -10.1% | 10.2% | 11.2 | 9.7 | 15.2% | 3.1% | 3.5% |
| China offshore | HSCEI Index | -4.1% | 1,915 | -11.5% | -40.5% | -36.1% | 8.4 | 7.5 | 11.8% | 3.7% | 3.9% |
| South Korea | KOSPI Index | 16.3% | 1,485 | -2.6% | -19.7% | 19.2% | | | | 2.2% | 2.4% |
| New Zealand | NZSE Index | 2.4% | 93 | 0.7% | -10.2% | -0.6% | 23.6 | 21.3 | 10.7% | 3.4% | 3.7% |
| Australia | AS30 Index | 1.5% | 1,705 | -1.9% | -2.8% | 19.9% | 14.3 | 14.2 | 0.6% | 4.3% | 4.4% |
| Pakistan | KSE100 Index | 2.3% | 18 | 0.1% | -14.2% | 20.5% | 3.3 | 2.8 | 18.0% | | |
| Thailand | SET50 Index | -8.0% | 357 | -7.1% | -4.9% | -4.2% | 17.1 | 14.9 | 14.7% | 2.8% | 3.2% |
| Indonesia | JCI Index | -3.2% | 625 | -7.2% | 11.5% | 39.5% | 13.8 | 1.7 | 719.4% | 4.2% | 4.3% |
| India | NIFTY Index | 2.4% | 1,773 | 11.8% | 18.3% | 82.7% | 19.6 | 16.3 | 19.8% | 1.5% | 1.8% |
| Singapore | FSSTI Index | -2.6% | 360 | -1.9% | 0.2% | 21.2% | 10.3 | 10.1 | 1.5% | 5.2% | 5.5% |
| Malaysia | FBMKLCI Index | -7.6% | 209 | -10.2% | -12.5% | -11.2% | 13.2 | 12.3 | 7.3% | 4.5% | 4.7% |
| Philippines | PCOMP Index | -0.8% | 164 | -3.4% | -4.2% | 0.7% | 12.2 | 11.2 | 8.5% | 2.6% | 2.6% |
| Vietnam | VNINDEX Index | 8.3% | 183 | -15.3% | -20.6% | 23.1% | 10.6 | 8.8 | 21.1% | | |

* Market cap for the main index
Data as of 31st May 2023

Source(s): Bloomberg Finance L.P., Arbion Ltd.

THREE-MONTH OUTLOOK

| | | | |
|---|---------------|--|--------|
|  | | The coronavirus outbreak hit the world economy at a late stage in the cycle, causing a deep recession and leading to unprecedented stimulus. The current period of normalisation is characterised by elevated inflation and a hawkish central bank response but also a re-introduction of appropriate cost of capital and risk-free rates. | Weight |
| | Cash | At average levels | → |
| Equities | US | Sticky inflation and slowing growth are putting pressure on markets. However, as inflationary forces recede, the outlook could improve over the course of the year. | → |
| | Europe | European markets are cheaper compared to the US and more tilted towards defensive industries. A cheap currency helps the economy, and the ECB is approaching interest rates cautiously. | → |
| | Japan | Inflation is beginning to pick up in the country, with yield-curve control being relaxed. This provides support to the financial sector. The cheap yen is supportive for the country's export industries. | ↗ |
| | China | Following the re-opening of its economy, China appears to be focusing more on the consumer rather than large-scale stimulus. The market is cheap but is so for many reasons. | → |
| | EM | Many emerging markets ex-China are suffering from idiosyncratic issues and were hit hard by the global pandemic. Valuations are generally very low offering scope for upside. | → |
| | Central Banks | Central banks in most major economies are hawkish, trying to arrest high inflation levels. Bond markets are pricing a steep and swift initial rate hike path followed by rate cuts. | |
| Fixed Income | DM govt | Inflation volatility is high and central banks are determined to tackle the challenge. Some more rate tightening appears necessary before considering this asset class. | → |
| | EM govt | Emerging market central banks are dealing with a variety of different issues and inflation is not yet under control. | → |
| | DM credit | Spreads across investment-grade and high-yield fixed income are contained compared to history. The short to medium-duration IG space is now attractive again for investors. | ↗ |
| | EM credit | We avoid issuers with substantial hard-currency debt relative to the underlying revenue mix. Spreads for fundamentally strong issuers in hard currency are attractive. | ↗ |
| | Alt FI | Rising bond market yields are putting pressure on this area as a genuine risk-free option is now available again for investors. | → |
| Currencies | USD | The dollar has enjoyed a strong recovery, fuelled by a more hawkish Federal Reserve that could see real interest rates rising further in the future. However, most of the strengthening is now behind us. | → |
| | EUR | The change in the monetary policy outlook for the eurozone is bullish for the common currency. Once dollar strength subsides, this would be positive for the common currency. | → |
| | JPY | The yen has been fundamentally undervalued for a long time and recent adjustments to the BoJ's monetary policy could lead to further upside for the currency. Patience is required. | ↗ |
| | EM | Emerging markets are suffering from receding global trade, devaluations as well as other idiosyncratic issues. Commodity currencies appear attractive although that cycle is slowing too. | → |
| | GBP | The stronger dollar puts pressure on GBP and the currency is currently trading within our fair-value range. | → |
| Commodities | Oil | Oil prices are expected to remain volatile, driven by geopolitical forces but also imbalanced global economies. The longer-term outlook is moderately bullish. | → |
| | Metals | Although industrial metal prices are benefiting from bottlenecks and supply issues, markets are beginning to price in the prospect of a global recession. | ↘ |
| | Gold | Gold is traditionally a good diversifier in multi-asset portfolios. Rising interest rates are posing a threat to near-term performance but Gold's relative strength is encouraging. | → |

IMPORTANT INFORMATION

Signia Invest is a trading name of Arbion Limited.

Arbion Limited is Authorised and Regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority FRN: 513138 and is registered as an investment adviser with the SEC, CRN 155663. Arbion Limited is a private limited company incorporated in England and Wales under company number 07044573 with its registered office located at One Connaught Place, London, W2 2ET.

This document has been prepared for and is intended for the sole use of the person or firm to whom it is addressed. Any reproduction or distribution, in whole or in part, or the disclosure of the content of this document without prior written consent is prohibited.

The material set out in this document should not be construed as solicitation, offer, or recommendation to acquire or dispose of any investment, engage in any transaction or make use of the services of Arbion. Information about prior performance, while a useful tool in evaluating Arbion's investment activities, is not indicative of future results and there can be no assurance that Arbion will generate results comparable to those previously achieved. Any targeted returns set out in this presentation are provided as an indicator as to how your investments will be managed by Arbion and are not intended to be viewed as a representation of likely performance returns. There can be no assurance that targeted returns will be realised. An estimate of the potential return from an investment is not a guarantee as to the quality of the investment or a representation as to the adequacy of the methodology for estimating returns.

Although we have made reasonable effort to obtain information from sources believed to be reliable, Arbion gives no representations or warranties, either express or implied, that the information and opinions expressed in this document are accurate, complete or current. This information and opinions enclosed are provided solely for informational purposes and are subject to change without notice. No responsibility is accepted to any person for the consequences of any person placing reliance on the content of this document for any purpose.

Nothing in this document constitutes investment, account, legal, regulatory, tax or other advice. Recipients should consult their own legal, tax, accounting and financial advisors regarding the economic benefits and risks of the investments or transactions described in this document, and the potential legal, regulatory, credit, tax and account impact of such investments or transactions based upon their individual circumstances.

No action has been taken to permit the distribution of this document in any jurisdiction where any such action is required. Such distribution may be restricted in certain jurisdictions and, accordingly, this document does not constitute, and may not be used for the purposes of, an offer or solicitation to any person in any jurisdiction where such offer or solicitation is unlawful.